 Most previous commentary on enforcement of directors' duties has focussed on the civil penalty regime, yet this paper shows that criminal enforcement of directors' duties by the CDPP was significantly more prevalent than civil enforcement by ASIC. Comparing directors' duties that attract both civil and criminal liability, criminal enforcement by the CDPP was responsible for about 81% of all matters in which liability was established and about 61% of all defendants found liable.
 Much of the debate surrounding penalties for corporate wrongdoing has centred on the maximum pecuniary penalty of $200,000 in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). However, this paper reveals that incapacitative sanctions, such as custodial sentences and civil management disqualification orders, were much more frequently imposed than pecuniary penalties. Prison sentences and disqualification orders each accounted for about 33.50% of the total number of sanctions imposed (67% collectively), while about 18% of the sanctions were civil pecuniary penalties and only about 2% were criminal fines.
 While the statutory maximum civil pecuniary penalty is $200,000, this paper reveals that the penalties imposed by courts are typically much lower than the maximum. The median civil pecuniary penalty imposed on defendants who had engaged in a single contravention of a directors' duties provision was $25,000, which is only 12.50% of the statutory maximum. The median penalty imposed on all defendants, including defendants who had engaged in multiple contraventions, was $50,000.
 The average civil management disqualification order was about 5.2 years. The average maximum prison sentence was about 2.25 years, while the average minimum (i.e. minimum amount of time that must be served) was about 1.4 years. However, a significant proportion of prison sentences, about 46%, involved immediate release subject to a good behaviour bond.
 Both ASIC and the CDPP enjoyed high litigation success rates. Despite the higher standard of proof applicable to criminal proceedings for breach of directors' duties, the CDPP's success rates were not significantly lower than ASIC's. The CDPP and ASIC established liability in about 88% and 89% of matters respectively. In terms of individual defendants, the CDPP and ASIC established liability in relation to about 84% and 92% of defendants respectively.
 Contrary to a commonly held view that civil enforcement is more efficient than criminal enforcement, the duration of both the civil and criminal enforcement processes was lengthy. From the first detected contravention to the final judgment, the average duration of civil matters was about 6.9 years, while the average duration of criminal matters was about 7.9 years. This working paper advances the understanding of how directors' duties are enforced in practice by way of a detailed empirical study of civil and criminal proceedings brought by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP). It analyses the sanctions imposed in such proceedings by reference to a number of criteria, including: jurisdiction (civil or criminal); quantity (number of matters and defendants); type (specific kind of sanction); and magnitude (amount or duration of sanction). In addition, this paper addresses broader issues relating to the enforcement process, including the liability rates (i.e. win/loss rates), duration of the enforcement process and ASIC media release coverage of civil and criminal enforcement of directors' duties.
AN ANALYSIS OF PENALTIES UNDER ASIC ADMINISTERED LEGISLATION: OTHER PUBLICATIONS
This paper breaks new ground by analysing public enforcement of directors' duties (i.e. enforcement by statutory agencies rather than private parties 2 ) in greater detail than previous empirical studies. It also presents previously unpublished data on criminal directors' duties matters obtained from the CDPP via an application under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). Previous empirical studies on public enforcement of directors' duties have not tended to cover the full range of enforcement methods or analyse in detail the sanctions imposed. Most empirical studies have focussed on civil enforcement by ASIC. 3 Studies that have investigated criminal enforcement outcomes have done so mainly by reference to the jurisdiction and number of matters. 4 This paper adds significant depth to previous studies by examining additional criteria such as the number of defendants and the specific type and magnitude of sanctions. These additional criteria contribute to a more complex understanding of how directors' duties are enforced by ASIC and the CDPP.
The analysis in this working paper is based on an empirical database of sanctions imposed in civil and criminal proceedings brought by ASIC and the CDPP for contraventions of directors' 2 See page 6 of this working paper for further discussion regarding the distinction between public and private enforcement of directors' duties. 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 191, 195, 208 and 588G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and their predecessors, ss 232(4), 232(2), 232(6), 232(5), 231, 232A, 243H and 588G of the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth). The study sample covers the full range of provisions that are considered to constitute 'directors' duties'. The content of these duties is set out in Table 1 in Part III of this paper.
This working paper focusses on civil and criminal enforcement and presents the preliminary findings of a broader research project on public enforcement of directors' duties. This paper will be followed by a final paper on public enforcement of directors' duties which will be published in 2016. The final paper will present some additional data on administrative and negotiated enforcement of directors' duties and consider the extent to which the original aspirations of the civil penalty regime, as discussed in extrinsic material surrounding the introduction of the regime, have been put into practice. Among other issues, the paper will address to what extent the system of responsive regulation and 'pyramid of enforcement' 5 envisaged by those who advocated for the civil penalty regime have been implemented. This detailed analysis of the civil penalty regime as it applies to directors' duties will be of interest not only to those who work in corporate regulation but also to the broader regulatory community, as civil penalties are an increasingly common feature of Australian legislation in corporations law and many other areas of law.
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The structure of this working paper is as follows: Part II discusses the importance of empirical research on public enforcement of directors' duties; Part III outlines the content of directors' duties and describes the civil and criminal sanctions applying to contraventions of the duties; Part IV explains the coverage of the empirical database and the methods used to identify and collect data on enforcement of directors' duties; Part V presents a series of tables containing the data and discusses the preliminary findings of the research; and Part VI summarises the key findings of this paper and outlines in more detail the forthcoming final paper on public enforcement of directors' duties.
II IMPORTANCE OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT OF DIRECTORS' DUTIES
The empirical research presented in this working paper and the forthcoming final paper on public enforcement of directors' duties is important for a number of reasons.
First, directors' duties regulate the conduct of individuals who have the most significant influence on the actions of corporations, which are numerous and, in some cases, command substantial social and economic power. The modern corporate sector has a profound effect on our life. It is crucial to the creation of the nation's wealth. Society looks to it to produce that wealth ethically and in accordance with community values. Directors are the mind and soul of the corporate sector. They are crucial to how its great power is exercised. They can weaken and even suppress markets. They can disturb and destroy an environment. Their actions can have a profound effect on the lives of the shareholders, employees, creditors and the public generally. A legal framework has developed regulating companies' incorporation and providing a mechanism for their winding-up, laying down standards of conduct for their officers, protecting shareholders and regulating how they may merge and be taken over.
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The important role of directors has also been recognised by the judiciary. For example, Justice Middleton commented in ASIC v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291: A director is an essential component of corporate governance. Each director is placed at the apex of the structure of direction and management of a company. The higher the office that is held by a person, the greater the responsibility that falls upon him or her. The role of a director is significant as their actions may have a profound effect on the community, and not just shareholders, employees and creditors. 11 Second, enforcement of directors' duties constitutes a significant component of the overall enforcement activity of ASIC and the CDPP is also actively engaged in the enforcement of directors' duties. According to ASIC's enforcement reports from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2015, 'actions against directors' constituted over half of ASIC's 'enforcement outcomes' within the regulatory area of corporate governance. 12 The CDPP does not publish enforcement reports; however, proceedings brought by the CDPP account for 72.73% of matters and 52.20% of defendants in the study sample, indicating that enforcement of directors' duties is an important area of the CDPP's operational practices.
Of course, directors' duties can also be enforced via private civil proceedings. An empirical study published by Varzaly in 2015 
III DIRECTORS' DUTIES AND SANCTIONS FOR CONTRAVENTION
The directors' duties provisions that are the subject of this empirical study are: ss 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 191, 195, 208 Duty not to give a financial benefit to a related party of a public company without member approval A public company, or an entity that the public company controls, must not give a financial benefit to a related party of the public company without obtaining member approval pursuant to s 208 (1) Duty to prevent insolvent trading by company
Must prevent the company from incurring a debt if the company is insolvent or becomes insolvent by incurring that debt, or debts including that debt, and there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company is insolvent or would so become insolvent and the director is aware that there are such grounds or a reasonable person in a like position in a company in the company's circumstances would be so aware 588G(2) Director 588G(3) Combination of absolute liability, strict liability and dishonesty
Director

A Civil Sanctions for Contraventions of Directors' Duties
All of the duties outlined in Table 1 are subject to civil sanctions except ss 191 and 195. Where a duty is subject to civil penalty sanctions and the court is satisfied that a defendant has contravened the duty, the court is required to make a declaration of contravention: s 1317E(1). ASIC can then seek a pecuniary penalty order, a disqualification order or a compensation order. The court proceedings are civil proceedings in terms of the application of rules of evidence and procedure: s 1317L. This means that there must be proof on the balance of probabilities that there has been a contravention rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is the higher standard of proof that applies to criminal proceedings. 
Pecuniary penalty order:
Where a court has declared that a defendant has contravened a director's duty that is subject to civil penalty sanctions, the court may order that person to pay a pecuniary penalty to the Commonwealth government of up to $200,000 if the contravention:
 materially prejudices the interests of the company or its creditors;
 materially prejudices the company's ability to pay its creditors; or  is serious: s 1317G.
Disqualification order:
Where a court has declared that a defendant has contravened a director's duty that is subject to civil penalty sanctions, the court may disqualify that person from managing companies for a period the court considers appropriate if the court is satisfied that the disqualification is justified. In determining whether the disqualification is justified, the court may have regard to:
 the person's conduct in relation to the management, business or property of any company; and  any other matters that the court considers appropriate: s 206C.
Compensation order: Where a court has declared that a defendant has contravened a director's duty that is subject to civil penalty sanctions and damage has resulted from the contravention, then the court may order the person to compensate the company for damage suffered by it. The damage suffered by the company for the purposes of making a compensation order includes any profits made by the person resulting from the contravention: s 1317H.
B Criminal Sanctions for Contraventions of Directors' Duties
All of the duties outlined in Table 1 are subject to criminal sanctions except s 180. The duties not to make improper use of position, not to make improper use of information, not to give a financial benefit to a related party of a public company, to act in good faith in the best interests of the company, to act for a proper purpose, and to prevent the company from trading while it is insolvent, are subject to the same criminal penalties. A defendant who commits an offence by breaching any of these statutory duties in the way specified may be fined up to 2,000 penalty units ($360,000), or imprisoned for up to five years, or both: Schedule 3 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Directors' duties proceedings are typically divided into separate judgments for liability and penalties. Consequently, directors' duties judgments fall into three broad categories: unproven liability judgments (i.e. judgments in which ASIC or the CDPP failed to establish the liability of any of the defendant/s); proven liability judgments (i.e. judgments in which ASIC or the CDPP succeeded in establishing the liability of all or some of the defendant/s); and penalty judgments (judgments in which sanctions are imposed on defendants found liable in proven liability judgments). The 99 'matters' in the dataset are comprised of penalty judgments, 34 which are herein referred to as 'proven matters', and unproven liability judgments, which are herein referred to as 'unproven matters'. In relation to appeals involving a series of penalty judgments, each judgment that was the final penalty judgment for one or more of the defendants was counted as a separate 'proven matter'. For example, in the proceedings relating to James Hardie Industries Ltd, the CEO Peter MacDonald did not appeal the first instance decision and the CFO Phillip Morley only appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal, while the remaining eight defendant directors (the 34 To avoid inflation of the number of proven matters, the dataset does not separately count penalty judgments that were formally multiple judgments but substantively constituted a single judgment. These proceedings have been counted as one 'unproven matter' for the final unproven liability judgment of the High Court.
Because 'proven matters' are classified as matters in which liability was established against all or only some defendants, there are occasional 'proven matters' which involve defendants who were alleged to have contravened directors' duties provisions but found not to have contravened such provisions. Thus, the classification of the data distinguishes between 'liable defendants' in proven matters and 'non-liable' defendants in proven matters.
Public enforcement of directors' duties in Australia is not limited to final court proceedings. Contraventions of directors' duties are also the subject of interlocutory proceedings (e.g. injunctions, restraining orders, and asset preservation orders), administrative decisions (e.g. banning of directors pursuant to ASIC's power of disqualification in s 206F of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)) and negotiated outcomes (e.g. enforceable undertakings and informally negotiated settlements). These matters are not covered in this working paper. However, this research project's final paper on directors' duties will present some additional data on disqualifications pursuant to s 206F and enforceable undertakings involving contraventions of directors' duties.
The database contains judgments from superior courts, encompassing supreme courts, courts of appeal and federal courts, and judgments from inferior courts, encompassing district/county courts and local/magistrates' courts. Different methods were used to identify superior court and inferior court judgments. The following online databases were used to identify superior court judgments: LexisNexis AU, Westlaw AU, the Australasian Legal Information Institute (AustLII) and JADE Professional. A freedom of information request to the CDPP pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) was used to identify inferior court judgments, as such judgments are not usually available via online databases. It was not necessary to make a freedom of information request to ASIC as it is not possible to bring civil proceedings for contraventions of directors' duties in inferior courts. Section 58AA in conjunction with ss 1317E, 1317G, 1317H, 206C, 206D A further three superior court matters were identified via the freedom of information request to the CDPP that are not available on any of the four online legal databases; however, information regarding these matters was available in ASIC media releases. In total, the database contains 51 superior court matters involving 107 defendants.
Once the superior court judgments were identified, several categories of data were extracted in relation to the judgments, including: matter name; citation; jurisdiction; forum; decision-maker; appellate level; media release coverage; date of alleged contravention; date of earliest media release relating to the matter; date of judgment; name, age, sex, position of defendant; name, type and industry of company; prior wrongs/offences by the defendant; outcome; section numbers; number of contraventions; other laws contravened; and sanction type and magnitude.
In respect of the inferior court judgments in the database, the freedom of information application to the CDPP requested the following information: Including: matter number; name of defendant/s; referring agency; phase (eg, summary, trial, sentence, appeal against acquittal and/or sentence by CDPP, appeal against conviction and/or sentence by defendant/s); court; jurisdiction; date offence/s committed or allegedly committed; date defendant/s charged; date matter finalised; section/s contravened or allegedly contravened; number of counts by each defendant in relation to each section contravened or allegedly contravened; plea (if applicable); outcome (eg, discontinuance, acquittal, conviction, sentence, appeal dismissed, appeal allowed; penalties imposed on each defendant in relation to each count (eg, terms of imprisonment, non-parole periods, recognisance release orders, fines, other outcomes, such as community based orders), including the extent to which the penalties are cumulative and/or concurrent; and total penalties imposed on each defendant.
The CDPP provided information which included: dates matter received and completed; legislation name; section number; phase (eg, committal, trial, sentence, appeal); plea/outcome (eg, guilty plea, proven, acquitted); appeal outcome (eg, allowed, dismissed); and penalties (eg, imprisonment, fine, good behaviour bond, community service order, along with the amount and/or duration of the penalty). In total, the database contains 48 inferior court matters involving 54 defendants. In some instances, the data provided by the CDPP has been supplemented with information contained in ASIC media releases where additional detail was required.
V RESEARCH FINDINGS
This part of the working paper presents the preliminary findings of an analysis of matters and sanctions contained in the empirical database by reference to the following criteria: jurisdiction (i.e. civil or criminal); quantity (i.e. number of matters and defendants); type (i.e. specific kind of sanction); and magnitude (i.e. amount or duration of sanction). It also analyses a number of broader aspects of the enforcement process, including the liability rates, duration of the enforcement process and ASIC media release coverage of civil and criminal matters.
Section A provides the legal context for the subsequent empirical analysis of matters, sanctions and enforcement, presenting data on the number of matters in which contravention of each civil and criminal directors' duties provision was proven. Section B provides a broad overview of the matters contained in the database, including data on the number of proven and unproven matters and number of defendants involved in these matters. Section C examines the matters in more detail through an analysis of data on the particular types and magnitude of sanctions. Section D discusses liability rates, duration of the enforcement process and ASIC media release coverage of civil and criminal matters. Tables 2 and 3 show how frequently each civil and criminal directors' duties provision was enforced, based on the number of matters in which contravention of each provision was proven. As ss 191 and 195 do not attract civil liability, these provisions have not been included in Table 2 . Likewise, ss 180, 181, 182 and 183 have not been included in Table 3 because they do not attract criminal liability. As outlined in Part III, ss 181, 182 and 183 have counterpart criminal offences in the form of ss 184(1), 184(2) and 184(3), whereas the duty of care and diligence in s 180 has no criminal counterpart. Table 2 shows that ss 180, 181 and 182 were the most frequently enforced civil directors' duties provisions. Sections 183, 208 and 588G were rarely enforced. Collectively, ss 180, 181 and 182 accounted for 39 of the total of 45 occasions on which contravention of a civil directors' duties provision was proven (86.67%). Section 180 alone accounted for 18 of the 45 such occasions (40%). These results are broadly consistent with Table 3 , which shows that the criminal offence counterparts of ss 181 and 182, ss 184(1) and 184(2), were the most frequently enforced criminal directors' duties provisions. Table 3 shows that the disparity between the enforcement frequency of ss 184(1)-(2) and the other criminal directors' duties provisions is even greater than the corresponding disparity discussed above regarding ss 180-182 and the other civil provisions. Sections 184(1) and 184(2) collectively accounted for 63 of the total of 65 occasions on which contravention of a criminal directors' duties provision was proven (96.92%). Section 184(2) was particularly frequently enforced, accounting for 50 of the 65 such occasions (76.92%).
A Legal Context: Contraventions of Directors' Duties Provisions
Tables 2 and 3 combined show that ss 181 and its criminal counterpart, s 184(1), were enforced with a similar frequency. Sections 181 and 184(1) were proven to have been contravened in 11 and 13 matters respectively. By contrast, s 182 was much less frequently enforced than its criminal counterpart, s 184(2). Sections 182 and 184(2) were proven to have been contravened in 10 and 50 matters respectively. Section 184(2) alone accounted for 45.45% of the combined total of 110 occasions on which contravention of a directors' duties provision was proven (50 of 110).
Overall, the duty to not improperly use position in s 182 and its criminal counterpart, 184(2), was by far the most frequently enforced directors' duty, accounting for 60 (10 civil, 50 criminal) of the total of 110 occasions on which contravention of a directors' duties provision was proven (54.55%). The duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the corporation and the duty to act for proper purposes was the next most frequently enforced duty, accounting for 24 (11 civil, 13 Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the matters contained in the database by reference to the number and percentage of proven and unproven matters and the number and percentage of defendants involved in those matters. These tables enable a broad comparison between the prevalence of civil and criminal enforcement of directors' duties. Defendants in unproven matters __ 7 7
All first instance matters __ 48 48 All appeal matters __ 0 0
The data presented in Table 4 breaks new ground in the empirical study of public enforcement of directors' duties by analysing the data in greater detail than previous empirical studies. It also presents previously unpublished data on criminal directors' duties matters obtained from the CDPP via an application pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). As noted in the introduction to this paper, despite the significant role of criminal enforcement of directors' duties, most previous studies have focussed on ASIC and civil enforcement.
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Previous studies that have investigated the CDPP and criminal enforcement have tended to analyse the data only by reference to the number of matters. defendants, resulting in a more complex understanding of the relative prevalence of civil and criminal enforcement of directors' duties. While Table 4 shows that, overall, civil enforcement yielded a slightly higher number of liable defendants than criminal enforcement, Table 4 does not provide the most accurate comparison possible between the prevalence of civil and criminal enforcement. The reason for this is that Table 4 includes matters in which s 180 was the only directors' duties provision contravened, which skews the data in favour of civil enforcement, as s 180 only attracts civil liability. Table 5 is a variation on Table 4 which excludes matters in which s 180 was the only directors' duties provision contravened or allegedly contravened. By default, it also excludes s 191 and 195, which only attract criminal liability, as there were no matters in which these provisions were contravened. Table 5 therefore provides a more meaningful comparison between civil and criminal enforcement based on the same set of duties, all of which can be enforced by both civil and criminal proceedings. 
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C Detailed Examination: Types and Magnitude of Sanctions
The preceding analysis of the relative prevalence of civil and criminal enforcement is interesting from the point of view of enforcement strategy; however, it only provides the beginnings of an understanding of the substantive effect of enforcement. From the perspective of substantive effect, the distinction between civil and criminal jurisdictions is sometimes not as meaningful as it first appears. For example, criminal sanctions can be lenient, such as a 12 month good behaviour bond, while civil sanctions can be severe, such as a 25 year management disqualification order. To advance the understanding of the substantive effect of sanctions imposed for contraventions of directors' duties, it is necessary to also examine the specific type and magnitude of the sanctions.
Types of Sanctions imposed for Contraventions of Directors' Duties
The Of course, interlocutory orders such as restraining orders and asset preservation orders can also be imposed in civil and criminal matters, however these sanctions fall outside the scope of this working paper. Table 6 displays the number of matters in which particular types of sanctions were imposed and the number of defendants upon whom such sanctions were imposed within the civil and criminal jurisdictions. In terms of the number of matters in which particular types of sanctions were imposed, prison sentences were by far the most common sanction. There were 87 proven matters during the ten year study period (see Table 4 ), meaning that imprisonment was imposed in 65.52% of proven matters (57 of 87). Most of these matters also entailed automatic disqualification pursuant to s 206B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). As explained in Part III.B of this paper, criminal convictions for breach of directors' duties provisions, except ss 191 and 195, result in automatic management disqualification for a five year period. Civil disqualification was imposed in 25.29% of proven matters (22 of 87), civil pecuniary penalties in 18.39% (16 of 87) and criminal fines in 4.60% (4 of 87). However, imprisonment was not as predominant when the data is analysed according to the number of defendants upon whom the sanctions were imposed. In total, there were 142 defendants who had sanctions imposed on them (see Table 4 ). Imprisonment and disqualification were each imposed on 44.37% of these defendants (63 of 142 each); that is, imprisonment and disqualification collectively were imposed on 126 of 142 defendants. Pecuniary penalties were imposed on 23.94% of such defendants (34 of 142), while criminal fines were only imposed on 2.82% (4 of 142).
These results show that there was a significant emphasis on incapacitative sanctions, such as imprisonment and disqualification. Imprisonment or disqualification was imposed in 90.80% of matters in which a sanction was imposed (79 of 87) and imposed on 88.73% of defendants upon whom a sanction was imposed (126 of 142). Of these two sanctions, it appears that imprisonment was more prevalent at first glance, at least in the sense that imprisonment was imposed in more matters, if not imposed on more defendants. However, a more complex picture emerges when the data is analysed in more detail.
Imprisonment and disqualification were imposed on equal numbers of defendants during the study period; however, prison sentences sometimes only resulted in automatic Good behaviour bond only 3 4
Community service order only 1 1
Reparation/compensation* 7 7 disqualification pursuant to s 206B rather than actual imprisonment. Only two of the 63 proven criminal matters involved discharge without conviction pursuant to s 19B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), therefore the vast majority of proven criminal matters resulted in an automatic five year disqualification period. At the same time, a significant proportion of the prison sentences for contraventions of directors' duties involved immediate release conditional on a good behaviour bond. Of the 28 defendants in the database who only contravened directors' duties provisions (i.e. defendants who had not contravened any other laws) and received a prison sentence for those contraventions, 13 of the sentences involved immediate release conditional on a good behaviour bond (46.43%). While the sample size is small, this data suggests that almost half of defendants sentenced to imprisonment for contraventions of directors' duties do not serve any prison time but instead receive automatic five year disqualifications as a result of their convictions. It is therefore arguable that disqualification was effectively the predominant form of sanction imposed for contraventions of directors' duties during the ten year study period. Table 7 is a variation on Table 6 that shows the number of matters and defendants that attracted the main monetary sanctions, civil pecuniary penalties and criminal fines, as compared with the main incapacitative sanctions, civil disqualification and prison sentences. As noted in the introduction to this paper, previous empirical studies of public enforcement of directors' duties have tended to analyse sanctions along jurisdictional lines, which, as noted above, is not always the most meaningful distinction. Table 7 provides a new perspective on the data by grouping sanctions based on the similarity of their substantive effect, rather than by reference to their formal jurisdiction. While pecuniary penalties are 'civil' and fines are 'criminal', the similarity in terms of their substantive impact is greater than the similarity between pecuniary penalties and civil disqualification orders. Of course, criminal convictions resulting in fines usually entail an automatic five year disqualification period pursuant to s 206B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), as this applies to all convictions for contraventions of directors' duties, except ss 191 and 195, not only convictions for which a prison sentence is imposed. However, it seems that, in practice, there is not as great a point of distinction between pecuniary penalties and fines as it first appears, as almost all pecuniary penalties in the database were also accompanied by a civil disqualification order. Of the 34 defendants upon whom pecuniary penalties were imposed (see Table 6 ), only three did not also receive a disqualification order. In regard to incapacitative sanctions, prison sentences can often be more substantively similar to disqualification orders than they are to fines, given the significant proportion of 'prison' sentences that do not in fact result in imprisonment but instead result in a five year disqualification period, as discussed above. Table 7 further highlights the significant emphasis on incapacitative sanctions, with 126 defendants receiving either disqualification orders or prison sentences and only 38 defendants receiving either pecuniary penalties or fines. Of the total number of 188 individual sanctions imposed (the sum of the figures in the right-hand column of Table 6 ), disqualification orders and prison sentences each accounted for 33.51% (63 of 188) of the sanctions (67.02% collectively, 126 of 188), while pecuniary penalties accounted for 18.09% (34 of 188) and fines only accounted for 2.13% (4 of 188). Incapacitative sanctions were imposed approximately three times more often than pecuniary penalties and fines.
Magnitude of Sanctions imposed for Contraventions of Directors' Duties
This section of the paper analyses the magnitude of sanctions imposed on defendants for contraventions of directors' duties. To conduct this analysis, it was necessary to exclude from the relevant study samples defendants who had contravened other provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or other laws altogether. In matters where the defendants had breached laws other than directors' duties, it was not usually possible to identify the proportion of the sanction that was attributable to the directors' duties contraventions as distinct from the breaches of the other laws. In many cases the judgments imposed a global sanction for all of the contraventions, while in others the sanctions attached to individual contraventions were partly cumulative and partly concurrent, meaning that it was not possible to identify the precise proportion of the final sanction attributable to the directors' duties contraventions. This has resulted in relatively small sample sizes.
This section of the paper continues the analysis of sanctions by reference to the distinction between monetary and incapacitative sanctions. Table 8 sets out the magnitude of civil pecuniary penalties and fines (monetary sanctions), while Table 9 presents the magnitude of civil disqualification orders and prison sentences (incapacitative sanctions). The sample sizes are indicated in parentheses. The term 'multiple contraventions' in Table 8 refers to the number of contraventions, not the number of provisions contravened. Thus, the defendants who committed 'multiple contraventions' may have committed multiple contraventions of the same provision or multiple contraventions of different directors' duties provisions. In most of the matters where defendants had committed multiple contraventions, it was not possible to identify the precise number of contraventions. This was typically because the unlawful incidents were numerous and tended to be bundled together into groups of contraventions, making it unclear whether the group of incidents constituted a 'contravention' or whether each incident within the group constituted a 'contravention'. It was only possible to identify with precision the number of contraventions in relation to five of the 16 defendants who had committed multiple contraventions as set out in Table 8 . Of this sample of five defendants, the average number of contraventions per defendant was five to six. Table 8 indicates that the civil pecuniary penalties imposed were quite low relative to the statutory maximum of $200,000, keeping in mind that this is the maximum for a single contravention and the majority of defendants had committed multiple contraventions (16 out of 27, or 59.26%) . The average and median pecuniary penalties imposed on defendants for a single contravention were both $25,000, amounting to only 12.50% of the maximum. However, there is a question as to whether this sample is representative of the typical pecuniary penalty, as seven of the 11 defendants within the sample were the non-executive directors in the James Hardie proceedings, all of whom received penalties of either $20,000 or $25,000.
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The average and median pecuniary penalties imposed on defendants with multiple contraventions were significantly higher, at $177,875 and $145,000 respectively, but they were still less than the maximum penalty for a single contravention, even though, as explained above, these defendants had typically engaged in numerous incidents of unlawful conduct such that it was not possible to identify the precise number of individual contraventions. The average penalty imposed on all defendants was $115,593, amounting to 57.80% of the maximum for a single contravention. However, the median penalty imposed on all defendants was much lower, at $50,000, due to the large number of penalties at the lower end of the scale. Ten of the 27 penalties ranged from $20,000 to $25,000. Only five of the penalties imposed on defendants who had committed multiple contraventions exceeded the statutory maximum of $200,000 for a single contravention, which were penalties of $201,000, $220,000, $350,000, $390,000 and $500,000.
In regard to fines for criminal convictions, the sample sizes are too low to yield any meaningful conclusions on the average magnitude of fines. However, the highest fines imposed were very low relative to the maximum fines available pursuant to Schedule 3 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The highest (and only) fine imposed on a defendant with a single directors' duties contravention was $10,000, which was 4.55% of the applicable maximum fine for a single contravention of $220,000 at the time. 45 The highest (and only) fine imposed on a defendant with multiple directors' duties contraventions was $75,000, which was 22.06% of the applicable maximum fine for a single contravention of $340,000 at the time. The two additional defendants who contravened other provisions attracting criminal fines in addition to directors' duties provisions were fined $4,000 and $10,000. Table 9 presents the magnitude of civil disqualification orders and prison sentences imposed on defendants who only contravened directors' duties and did not breach any other laws. The right-hand column displays the average maximum prison sentence imposed (i.e. the maximum period of actual incarceration, if the defendant does not comply with the conditions attached to the sentence) and the average minimum prison sentence imposed (i.e. the minimum period of actual incarceration, if the defendant complies with the conditions attached to the sentence). The 'maximum sentences' that were actually imposed, as referred to in Table 9 , are not to be confused with the statutory maximum sentence that could have been imposed, as described in Part III, Section B (i.e. five years per count, except in relation to ss 191 and 195) . Similarly, the 'minimum sentences' that were actually imposed, as referred to in Table 9 , should not be confused with minimum sentences required by statute, known as 'mandatory sentencing', which applies in some areas of sentencing but not sentencing for contraventions of the directors' duties provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Table 9 contains two variations on the average minimum sentence, one including defendants who were immediately released and one excluding defendants who were immediately released. Including defendants who were immediately released in the calculations dramatically brings down the average minimum sentence, due to the minimum sentence in such matters being zero. Table 9 presents a complex picture of the magnitude of incapacitative sanctions. There was a clear positive correlation between the number of contraventions and the duration of civil disqualification orders, in the sense that disqualification orders imposed on defendants with multiple contraventions (80.57 months) were on average longer than those imposed on defendants with a single contravention (22.60 months). However, there was no such correlation in relation to the number of counts for criminal convictions and the duration of prison sentences. The average civil disqualification order for defendants with multiple contraventions (80.57 months) was almost four times the average for defendants with a single contravention (22.60 months). By contrast, the average minimum prison sentence for defendants with multiple counts (8.53 months) was in fact slightly lower than the average for defendants with a single count (9.56 months). This distinction was also reflected in the highest sanctions imposed. The highest civil disqualification order for a defendant with multiple directors' duties contraventions (300 months) was much higher than the highest order for a defendant with a single contravention (27 months), whereas the highest maximum prison sentence (51 months) was in fact imposed on a defendant with only a single count.
In terms of the relative magnitude of civil and criminal incapacitative sanctions, the average duration of civil disqualification orders imposed on all defendants was 61.87 months (just over five years). The average duration of the maximum prison sentence imposed on defendants with a single count was 25.78 months, amounting to 42.97% of the maximum sentence of five years for a single count applicable to all of the directors' duties provisions except ss 191 and 195. As discussed above, the average duration of prison sentences for defendants with multiple counts did not differ much from the average for those with a single count. The average maximum prison sentence imposed on defendants with multiple counts was 27.84 months. Of course, as discussed previously, any criminal conviction for contravention of directors' duties, except ss 191 and 195, results in an automatic five year disqualification period pursuant to s 206B, so this must be taken into account when comparing the magnitude of civil and criminal incapacitative sanctions. Also, magnitude should not be equated with severity. It is difficult to meaningfully compare the severity of time spent disqualified from managing corporations and time spent serving a prison sentence. While the highest disqualification orders imposed in the 87 proven matters (permanent disqualification) were vastly higher than the lowest minimum prison sentence that did not involve immediate release (six weeks), six weeks of imprisonment could be regarded as more severe than permanent disqualification, given that deprivation of liberty is a much harsher sanction than disqualification from managing corporations.
Together, Tables 8 and 9 show that incapacitative sanctions are not only much more frequently imposed than monetary sanctions but also of a more significant magnitude. The median pecuniary penalty of $50,000 is relatively insignificant compared to the average 61.87 month disqualification order or 16.53 month minimum prison sentence followed by five years of automatic disqualification. However, all but three of the 38 defendants who received pecuniary penalties or fines also received either civil management disqualification orders or automatic disqualification pursuant to s 206B of the Corporations Act, so this must be taken into account when assessing the overall impact of the sanctions imposed on each defendant. There is some judicial authority suggesting that civil disqualification orders are to be treated as the default sanction and that pecuniary penalty orders are only to be imposed where disqualification would be an inadequate or inappropriate remedy. 46 This arguably supplementary role of pecuniary penalties could be part of the explanation why the magnitude of such penalties was relatively low. Given the accompanying disqualification periods, it may have been perceived as unnecessary to impose high monetary sanctions in addition to the disqualification orders.
D Liability Rates, Duration of the Enforcement Process and ASIC Media Release Coverage
This section of the paper presents data on a number of broader aspects of the enforcement process, including liability rates (i.e. win/loss rates), duration of the enforcement process and ASIC media release coverage (i.e. whether the matter was covered in ASIC media releases). These broader aspects contextualise the detailed data presented on matters, defendants and sanctions in the preceding sections and provide an important insight into the relative impact of civil and criminal enforcement. Table 10 presents the percentage and number of matters in which liability was proven and the percentage and number of defendants who were proven liable. Table 10 shows that, despite the higher standard of proof applicable to criminal matters, the liability rates for civil matters were not significantly higher than those for criminal matters. This may in part be due to the fact that the common law Briginshaw principle has often been applied to the civil standard of proof in proceedings for contraventions of directors' duties, which has effectively meant that in many civil matters the standard of proof has been higher than the balance of probabilities.
47 Table 11 presents data on the average duration of the civil and criminal enforcement processes. In regard to superior court proceedings, the duration of the enforcement process is measured from the date of the first detected contravention, as documented in the judgment, to the date of the final judgment. The information provided by the CDPP indicated the 'date received' and 'matter completed', which likely represents the time period between the date on which the CDPP received the brief from ASIC and the date the matter was closed subsequent to the final judgment. Thus, while the figures for superior court proceedings represent the duration of the entire enforcement process, including detection, investigation and litigation, the figures for the inferior court proceedings only represent the duration of the litigation phase of the enforcement process. This would include the time it takes the CDPP to conduct its assessment of the brief from ASIC in order to determine whether the matter is suitable for criminal prosecution. Table 11 shows that the civil enforcement process was on average only slightly quicker than the criminal enforcement process for superior court proceedings. In percentage terms, civil enforcement was 13.48% quicker than criminal enforcement. However, it is difficult to directly compare the duration of civil and criminal proceedings as in some instances civil proceedings are stayed so that they do not jeopardise concurrent criminal proceedings. Whereas both civil and criminal enforcement had high success rates, the duration of the enforcement process in both jurisdictions was lengthy, with matters on average taking upward of seven years from the date of the first contravention to be finalised.
Finally, Table 12 presents data on the percentage and number of matters that were covered in ASIC media releases. This table shows that, although criminal enforcement was more prevalent than civil enforcement and criminal sanctions were generally more severe, criminal enforcement tends to attract less coverage in ASIC media releases. It is interesting to note that only 70% of proven superior court criminal matters were covered in ASIC media releases, as it might be expected that proven superior court matters would be most likely to attract media attention, given the higher status of the forum involved. However, five of the six superior court criminal matters that were not covered in ASIC media releases involved appeals that were dismissed, so the enforcement outcome was unchanged. 
VI CONCLUSION
The preliminary research findings presented in this working paper have revealed a number of trends in relation to public enforcement of directors' duties that have not been identified or fully investigated in previous empirical studies. The following is a summary of the key findings presented in Part V.
 Sections 180, 181, 184(1) and 184(2) were the most frequently enforced directors' duties provisions. These provisions accounted for 102 of 110 (92.73%) occasions on which contravention of a directors' duties provision was proven. Section 184(2) was the most frequently enforced provision, accounting for 50 of 110 (45.45%) such occasions (see Tables 2 and 3 ).
 A significant proportion of public enforcement of directors' duties occurred at the inferior court level. Inferior court criminal matters accounted for 42 of 87 (48.28%) proven matters and 47 of 142 (33.10%) liable defendants (see Table 4 ).
 Criminal enforcement of directors' duties was more prevalent than civil enforcement. Excluding matters in which ss 180, 191 and 192 were the only provisions contravened or allegedly contravened, criminal enforcement accounted for 63 of 78 (80.77%) proven matters and 70 of 115 (60.87%) liable defendants (see Table 5 ). However, civil enforcement still accounted for a significant 45 of 115 (39.13%) liable defendants (see Table 5 ).
 Including matters in which ss 180, 191 and 192 were the only provisions contravened or allegedly contravened, civil enforcement accounted for more liable defendants than criminal enforcement, 72 of 142 (50.70%), despite accounting for fewer proven matters, 24 of 87 (27.59%) (See Table 4 ). This is due to the fact that civil matters often involved several defendants whereas criminal matters usually only involved one defendant.
 Incapacitative sanctions significantly outnumbered monetary sanctions. Of the total number of 188 individual sanctions imposed, disqualification orders and prison sentences each accounted for 33.51% (63 of 188) of the sanctions (67.02% collectively, 126 of 188), while pecuniary penalties accounted for 18.09% (34 of 188) and fines only accounted for 2.13% (4 of 188). Incapacitative sanctions were imposed approximately three times more often than pecuniary penalties and fines (see page 25).
 The median magnitude of monetary sanctions imposed on defendants who contravened only directors' duties provisions was low relative to the statutory maximum sanctions. The median civil pecuniary penalty imposed on defendants with a single contravention was $25,000 (12.50% of the maximum penalty for a single contravention of $200,000). The median penalty imposed on all defendants, including defendants with multiple contraventions, was $50,000. The sample sizes of fines for criminal convictions were too low to yield any meaningful conclusions regarding the average or median magnitude of fines. However, the highest (and only) fine imposed on a defendant with a single count was $10,000 (4.55% of the maximum fine for a single count of $220,000 applicable at the time of judgment). The highest (and only) fine imposed on a defendant with multiple counts was $75,000 (see Table 8 ).
 Of defendants who contravened only directors' duties provisions, the average civil disqualification order imposed on defendants with a single contravention was 22.60 months and the average imposed on all defendants, including defendants with multiple contraventions, was 61.87 months (see Table 9 ).
 Of defendants who contravened only directors' duties provisions, the average maximum prison sentence imposed on defendants with a single count was 25.78 months (42.97% of the statutory maximum sentence of five years for a single count applicable to all of the directors' duties provisions except ss 191 and 195). The average maximum sentence imposed on all defendants was 27.18 months. Respectively, the average minimum sentences were 17.20 months and 16.53 months (excluding matters which involved conditional immediate release) (see Table 9 ). All but two of the 63 proven criminal matters involved convictions and thereby attracted an automatic five year disqualification period pursuant to s 206B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (see page 24).
 A significant proportion of prison sentences involved immediate release. Of criminal defendants who only contravened directors' duties provisions, 13 of 28 (46.43%) defendants received prison sentences that involved immediate release conditional on good behaviour (see page 24).
 The liability rate for civil matters was only slightly higher than criminal matters, despite the higher standard of proof applying to criminal matters. Liability was proven in 24 of 27 (88.89%) civil matters and 63 of 72 criminal matters (87.50%). However, more civil defendants were found liable, 72 of 78 (92.31%), than criminal defendants, 70 of 83 (84.38%) (see Table 10 ).
 The average duration of the enforcement process was somewhat shorter for civil proceedings than criminal proceedings. From the first detected contravention to the final judgment, the average duration of superior court civil proceedings was 83 months while the average duration of criminal proceedings was 95 months (see Table 11 ).
 Civil matters received more frequent ASIC media release coverage than criminal matters. Despite criminal enforcement of directors' duties being more prevalent than civil enforcement, ASIC media releases covered 100% of civil matters but only 88.88% of criminal matters (see Table 12 ).
The forthcoming final paper on public enforcement of directors' duties to be published in 2016 will present some additional data on management disqualification orders pursuant to s 206F of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and enforceable undertakings involving contraventions of directors' duties. This data will allow for an analysis of four different methods of enforcement of directors' duties -criminal, civil, administrative and negotiated enforcement -and consideration of their relative prevalence and importance. Drawing on this empirical database, the paper will consider the extent to which the original aspirations of the civil penalty regime for the enforcement of directors' duties have been put into practice. Among other issues, the paper will address the extent to which the system of responsive regulation and 'pyramid of enforcement' 48 envisaged by those who advocated for the civil penalty regime have been implemented.
